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Agenda
• Leveraging Lessons Learned
• Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance
(S&MA) into design
• Lean, Kaizen, and Six Sigma Practices in
Design and Development
• Ares I-X
• Ares I
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Leveraging Lessons Learned
• Flying with Launch Abort System I
In-line Configuration
• Improving chances for escape
. .In emergencies
• Reducing ascent debris damage threat
• Using heritage hardware
• Apollo-derived J-2 engine
• Shuttle solid rocket boosters
• Upgrading to new hardware where
appropriate (e.g. avionics)
• Using weight-saving measures from
ET development
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S&MA Process Changes - Resources
• S&MA organization elevated from "Office" to "Directorate" level
• Civil Servant staffing increased from 102 in 2002 to 156 in 2006
Project resources still negotiated with the programs and projects -
but S&MA given real appeal authority to address shortfalls
• Resources provided for S&MA Technical Authority, Chief S&MA
and others
• S&MA grade structure brought closer to parity with engineering
• New S&MA Vision created and communicated
• S&MA unique discipline expertise
• S&MAs role of being part of the effort to find solutions
• Early S&MA involvement leads to improved quality, safety, and
reliability of the design
• Center Director actively championed the rotation of some of the
Center's best engineers into S&MA
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S&MA Process Changes - Independence
• Agency further transitioning to HQ direct funding for S&MA
managers designated as part of the technical authority
S&MA Technical Authority (TA) currently being defined
and institutionalized
• Will create a healthy balance between S&MA TA, Engineer TA, and
Program/Project Management authority
• S&MA TA will have a seat at every level of management - Level 4
through Level 1
• Will provide S&MA with the authority to assure S&MA requirements
are properly implemented in all programs and projects
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S&MA Process Changes - Discipline Expertise
• All S&MA personnel required to
select an S&MA discipline as the
primary area of expertise
• Professional Development
Roadmaps (PDRMs) created to
identify and list courses, knowledge
and the experience necessary to be
qualified at the various levels of
S&MA discipline development
• Discipline Champions established to
train and mentor S&MA personnel in
their efforts to develop
• Mandatory Discipline working groups
established to provide a forum for
discipline development and
knowledge sharing - run by
Discipline Champions
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• Performed Failure Mode Effect
Analysis (FMEA) on design of
Pressurization Control Panel
• Situation: A proposal was made to reduce
the total number of solenoid control valves
that control both the J-2X upper stage
engine's LH2 and L02 prevalves and
recirculation valves to reduce overall cost
and weight while increasing the overall
system reliability
• A formal reliability trade study was
requested to quantify the impact on
reliability compared to the baseline design
• The study team examined 4 alternative
valve designs that were more fault tolerant
• Conclusion: Design alternative 4 was
selected because it provided the highest
overall system reliability
S&MA Value Added - FMEAs
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S&MA Value Added -
Integrated System Failure Analysis
Critical Overpressure
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Integrated System Failure Analysis
Failure Event to Initial Failure Environment
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S&MA Value Added - System Safety
• Recommended move of pressurization line out of the First
Stage cable tray to reduce risk to LSC and avionics
Influenced common bulkhead monitoring
• Influenced valve design for LH2 and L02 pressurization to
maintain fault tolerance
• Opened issue for mitigation of overboard G02 venting
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S&MA Value Added - Up-Front Quality Involvement
• Manufacturing layout
Robotic welding tool procurement/acceptance
• Manufacturing Execution System
• Drawing Review
• Phased array ultrasonic weld inspection
• Workmanship Standards
• Process FMEA for TPS (in work)
• S&MA actively engaged in the process
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S&MA Today
• Receiving respect for technical expertise
• Becoming an organization where NASA's best and brightest
want to work
Bringing unique engineering expertise to the table in
support of programs and projects
• Programs see us as a must-have - not a forced-to-have group -
and programs request S&MA support beginning with program
formulation
• S&MA can help make systems safer and more reliable; early
recognition of vulnerabilities results in fewer re-design efforts
• Actively training and developing its people
• Not only identifying issues, but also helps identify solutions
• Rewarding and acknowledging superior performance
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Testing Strategy
• "Test as you fly" strategy
• Ground, flight, and orbital tests
• Ares I-X
• April 2009
• Suborbital flight test
• Combination of operational and
mockup hardware
• Demonstrate ability to control
Ares I vehicle
• Additional Ares tests
• Ares 1-Y: First flight of five-
segment RSRB
• Orion 1: First flight of J-2X
and Orion
• 2015: First crewed flight to
International Space Station
• 2018: First flight of Ares V
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Ares I-X Mission Overview
• Demonstrate the ascent flight
control system
• Characterize and mitigating the roll
torque due to first stage motor
performance for a vehicle
dynamically similar to the
operational vehicle
• Demonstrate nominal first
and upper stage separation
and clearances
• Test the First Stage parachute
recovery system and
separation/entry dynamics
• Validate assembly and processing
flow, as well as launch and
recovery operations
7442.14
• Meetings conducted for each
vehicle element to incorporate
an additional 60 days of
schedule margin
• Events consisted of identifying
the following activities:
• The current state
• The ideal state
• A realistic future/target state
• Assumptions, decisions, and/or
actions to be taken to achieve
the future state
• Meeting outputs
• Assuming 60-day change
could be made, Ares I-X
MMO managing to the earlier
launch date
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Lean Practices in Ares I-X
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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• Identified management need
for Lean processes:
• Different parts of Ares I-X
organization had conflicting
notions of safety conservatisms
in flight test
• Resolution: Combined all Ares
I-X activities under one Mission
Management Office (MMO)
under the Constellation Program
• Lean activities also reduced
number of review boards by 60%
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Lean Event Results
• First Stage
• Actions: Changed hardware
delivery schedule, pre-drilled some
hardware for quicker assembly, and
deferred avionics testing until the
hardware reached Kennedy Space
Center (KSC)
• Result: Reduced amount of touch-
labor time by as much as 4 to 30
days, depending on hardware
• Avionics
• Actions: Established hard
deadlines for delayed items;
condensed and reduced number of
check points; verified work on-site at
KSC; and rescheduled delivery of
some components
• Result: Met 60-day goal
• Roll Control System
• Action: Procured support hardware
prior to the element's Critical
Design Review (CDR)
• Result: Met 60-day goal
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• Upper Stage Simulator I
Command Module I Launch Abort
System Simulators
• The USS and CM/LAS schedules
already supported a 60-day pullback
• Ground Systems I
Ground Operations
• Actions: Streamlined procurement
process with United Space Alliance
(USA) by reducing the legal review
time from 42 to 28 days; reordered
activities on the launch pad, reducing
pad flow from 7.5 days to 5.5 days
• Result: Met 60-day goal
• Systems Engineering & Integration
• Actions: Streamlined (reduced
number of) review cycles for
Integrated Design and Analysis
Development Flight Instrumentation,
and Assembly Integration and Test
• Result: Met 60-day goal
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Lean, Six Sigma, and Kaizen Practices
in the Ares Projects Office
• Leadership commitment
• Ares Projects Office (APO) leaders
visited Boeing to learn about 787's
market share improvement through
lean practices
• APO leaders requested in-house training
for all managers on Lean and Kaizen
7442.1 B
Lean and Kaizen Success Stories
• Lean success stories
• Integrated Safety & Mission Assurance earlier in design process
• Developing and improving manufacturing processes for Ares I Upper Stage
• Improved communications between vehicle element offices
• Trained Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives on value stream mapping
• Kaizen process improvement success stories
• Improved the workforce planning process
• Reduced the length of project integration meetings
• Improved APO's risk management process
• Improved requirements change, trade study, and design review processes
• Kaizen new process development success stories
• Optimizing the ground support equipment flow for handling the Ares I Upper Stage
• Merging the manufacturing flows at the Michoud Assembly Facility
• Resolving differences in welding and manufacturing processes between NASA
and the Upper Stage prime contractor (Boeing)
• Optimizing the cleaning and corrosion protection processes
• Automating task description sheets
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Ares Six Sigma Practices
• Ares I Upper Stage Friction Stir Welding Tool
• Uses high rotational speed and frictional heat to
crush, "stir" together, and forge a bond between
two metal alloys
• At the end of the weld, the single-piece pin tool is
retracted and leaves a "keyhole"
• To overcome these drawbacks, a Marshall Center
welding engineer helped design an automatic
retractable pin tool to prevent keyholes
• Manufacturing and assembly team applied Six
Sigma processes to design an experiment to find
the optimum machine settings for ensuring a
nominal weld
• The analysis developed a set of values for
determining the proper settings for welds, as well
as determining the effectiveness of a weld if the
settings are known but off-nominal
• Result: Unprecedented level of accuracy and
minimization of weld stress
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Ares Team Norms and
S&MA Team Messages
• Treat others with dignity and respectHAW RlN
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S&MA in Ares Design - Summary
• Providing more resources to support Ares design work
• Making S&MA more independent for objective assessments
• Improving discipline expertise as well as training and mentoring
opportunities for new employees
• Adding value through Failure Mode Effect Analyses (FMEAs)
• Using the Ares quantitative safety and reliability requirement to
enforce the "Design for reliability and safety" paradigm shift
• Improving system safety by using a functional analysis system
approach to model and understand integrated system failures
similar to the Shuttle foam problem.
• Improving design reliability by using Probabilistic engineering
physics-based modeling
• Evaluating and understating design uncertainty and design
margins using probabilistic engineering techniques
• Getting involved in quality up front using Lean, Six Sigma, and
Kaizen practices
Receiving respect for technical expertise
• Becoming an organization where NASA's best and brightest want
to work
• Bringing unique engineering expertise to the table in support of
programs and projects
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Questions?
www.nasa.gov/ares
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